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The Vital Need to Eliminate a De Facto Negligence
Standard Under Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act
Matthew A. Powell*

I. INTRODUCTION
A.

DEFINING THE PROBLEM

Able to obtain large fees for little work, the plaintiffs’ bar has
made the filing of ‘merger objection’ lawsuits increasingly routine.
In 2008, approximately 54% of all public M&A deals were
challenged . . . This number rose sharply to 86% in 2009, and
continued to rise until its peak of 94% in 2013 . . . The percentage
of deals subject to suit hovered between 85% and 90% through
2015 . . . experts project that this trend will continue.1
In Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp. (“Varjabedian”), the Ninth Circuit
held that a claim for failure to satisfy a statutory disclosure provision
concerning tender offers only requires pleading “. . . negligence, not
scienter [intent].”2 A tender offer, means an offer by an acquiring company
to pay a cash price per share for the shares of the target company, here
Emulex, in order to acquire the target company.3
The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Varjabedian creates a clear
disagreement and a split with five other circuits (i.e., the Second, Third,
Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh), all of which have held that a Section 14(e)
claim requires proof of scienter,4 with scienter having been the required

* J.D. Candidate 2019, Emory University School of Law; M.B.A. Candidate 2019, Emory
University Goizueta School of Business; B.S.B.A. Business Management and Entrepreneurship 2015,
The University of Arizona. The author would like to thank Professor Joanna Shepherd for her valuable
insight and advice in the research and writing of this Article.
1. Brief for the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association as Amicus Curiae at 9, 12,
Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp. (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. pending, No. 18-459 (U.S. Nov. 13,
2018) [hereinafter Brief for the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association].
2. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 888 F.3d 399 (9th
Cir. 2018), cert. pending, (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459; see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 196-97 (1976).
3. THOMAS L. HAZEN, PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1, 245 (4th ed. 2016); see also
Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d at 402.
4. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d at 409–410.
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standard of culpability for nearly half a century.5 The relevant provision in
Varjabedian is Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
“1934 Act” or “Exchange Act”),6 which prohibits untrue statements or
omissions of material facts in connection with a tender offer (i.e., an
acquisition strategy).7 This Article will focus on the Ninth Circuit’s
unexpected Section 14(e) holding.
On October 11, 2018, Emulex filed a petition for a writ of certiorari
primarily requesting Supreme Court review of the Section 14(e) question.8
Emulex’s petition for certiorari further highlights the radical shift following
the Ninth Circuit’s holding, stating the following:
For the first fifty years of Section 14(e)’s existence, therefore,
there was uniform recognition in circuits across the country that
Section 14(e) does not support a private right of action or remedy
based on mere negligence, . . . [as] ‘no federal court ha[d] held that
§ 14(e) requires only a showing a negligence.’ However, the Ninth
Circuit blew up that consensus.9
Separate amicus curiae briefs were filed on November 13, 2018, by the
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association and the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States of America.10 Respondents timely filed
their brief for the respondents in opposition on November 30, 2018.11 Then
on December 18, 2018, the Petitioners’ reply brief was timely filed, setting
the stage for review.12 On January 4, 2019, the Supreme Court granted
Emulex’s petition for certiorari.13

5. Id.
6. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(e) (2012).
7. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d at 409–10; see also Aaron F. Miner et al., Supreme
Court Has Opportunity to Reexamine Implied Private Right of Action Under Section 14(e) of the
Exchange Act, ARNOLD & PORTER (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/
publications/2018/10/scotus-has-opportunity-to-reexamine [perma.cc/DQ3J-V8XP].
8. Aurora Barnes, Petitions of the week, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.scotus
blog.com/2018/11/petitions-of-the-week-18/ [perma.cc/XK9X-CPPP].
9. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 1,
14 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459.
10. Barnes, supra note 8.
11. Id.
12. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, at 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), reply brief for the
Petitioners filed, 1, 11 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459.
13. Public Information Office Supreme Court of the United States, A Reporter’s Guide to
Applications Pending Before the Supreme Court of the United States 1, 16, (2018), https://www.sup
remecourt.gov/publicinfo/reportersguide.pdf [perma.cc/Q5BA-T6K8].
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WHY IS VARJABEDIAN IMPORTANT? FINANCIAL STAKES AND DE FACTO
NEGLIGENCE STANDARD

The Ninth Circuit’s adoption of a negligence standard for claims
under § 14(e) of the Exchange Act will encourage stockholder
plaintiffs to continue filing frivolous “merger objection” cases in
district courts within the Ninth Circuit to circumvent [the scienter
requirement] and capitalize on the Ninth Circuit’s lenient
negligence standard. This, coupled with the Exchange Act’s
liberal jurisdiction provision, encourages forum-shopping, and
risks creating a de facto [national] negligence standard for all §
14(e) cases.14
Why is the Ninth Circuit’s Varjabedian holding important? The answer
is that securities class action plaintiffs will have accomplished quite a coup
if they can lower the standard of proof for Section 14(e) liability.15 The
increase of federal court lawsuits by investors challenging M&A
transactions is “[t]he single biggest development in securities class action
litigation in the past two years” (i.e., 2016-17).16
Merger objection lawsuits are often verbatim versions of prior
complaints with only the parties’ names changed, typically filed within
days of the merger announcement.17 This problem has grown so routine
that businesses view merger objection suits simply as a transaction or
merger tax on the tender offer.18 The Legal Reform Institute outlined the
plaintiffs’ bar strategy clearly, describing the abusive practice as follows:
Here’s how it works: Just about every merger or acquisition that
involves a public company and is valued over $100 million¾91%
of all such transactions in 2010 and 2011¾becomes the subject of
multiple lawsuits within weeks [or in Varjabedian’s case, within
twenty-four hours] of its announcement. Because the parties to the
merger want to close their deal and begin to reap the economic
benefits of the combination, the vast majority of these lawsuits
settle quickly¾within three months¾and typically provide little or

14. Brief for the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, supra note 1 at 13–14.
15. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 1,
24 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459.
16. Alison Frankel, Bucking precedent, 9th Circuit Opens Door to More M&A Challenges,
REUTERS (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/legal-us-otc-securities/bucking-precedent9th-circuit-opens-door-to-more-ma-challenges-idUSKBN1HU2NH [perma.cc/U8CX-QL6L].
17. Brief for the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, supra note 1, at 7.
18. Id. at 9.
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no benefit for shareholders. But the settlements do award large
attorneys’ fees to the lawyers who filed the lawsuits.19
In an effort to avoid derailing multi-million-dollar acquisition efforts,
firms who fear their deals’ death after being tied up in lengthy, often
frivolous, litigation20 will frequently settle merger objection cases.21
In Varjabedian, the plaintiffs (Emulex shareholders) alleged that the
target-defendant, Emulex, and other defendants omitted material
information about the offered purchase price per share when Emulex issued
its Recommendation Statement urging its shareholders to accept the
$8.00/share offer to purchase.22 In an attempt to avoid a costly discovery
dispute, Emulex then provided shareholders with the core documents,
including the so-called ‘Board Book’ that Goldman Sachs had complied.23
While facilitating additional disclosure may appear to be beneficial to
shareholders, in practice, however, class action plaintiffs have practically
forced corporations to facilitate a practice of over-disclosure.24 Overdisclosure results in corporations burying shareholders in an avalanche of
trivial information in order to mitigate risk and avoid liability.25 It is
important to note that disclosure documents frequently are already
“hundreds of pages long.”26
From a market efficiency perspective, this over-disclosure leads to
negative outcomes, like companies wasting resources by disclosing
immaterial information, and then investors waste their time, money, and
effort attempting to distill the material from the immaterial in disclosure.27
Put simply, and as demonstrated in the quote below, over-disclosure rarely
culminates a net positive outcome from an economic efficiency
perspective, nor is the practice conducive to informed decision-making.28
The federal securities laws not only are key to the efficient
functioning of markets, but also are prone to litigation abuses, as
Congress itself recognized in the PSLRA . . . If allowed to stand,

19. Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae at 1,
18, Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp. (9th Cir. 2018), No. 18-459 (U.S. Nov. 13, 2018) [hereinafter Brief
for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America].
20. Brief for the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, supra note 1, at 10.
21. Id. at 9.
22. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 1,
8 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459.
23. Id. at 7.
24. Brief for the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, supra note 1, at 16–17.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 17.
27. Id.
28. Id.

Spring 2019

ELIMINATE DE FACTO NEGLIGENCE

257

the Ninth Circuit’s decision [in Varjabedian] will fundamentally
alter the civil liability regime that courts have applied under
Section 14(e) for half a century and create the very litigation
abuses that Congress has sought to prevent in order to protect
businesses and markets.29
Prior to 2016, the plaintiffs’ bar exploited this opportunity fully in state
court, as the number of such cases quadrupled from 2005 to 2010.30 The
vast majority of these cases were filed in state court, most frequently in
Delaware, with approximately sixty percent of merger objection suits filed
in Delaware.31 However, in 2017, the number of M&A deals litigated in
federal court increased 20 percent, while state court filings declined.32 The
shift in forum is no coincidence.33
Both the decline of Delaware state court filings and the migration to
federal courts directly coincide with the time frame in which the Delaware
Chancery Court, in its 2016 Trulia decision,34 held that it would no longer
approve disclosure-only settlements except in “unusual circumstances.”35
Put simply, attorneys who obtained only additional proxy disclosures as
contrasted with money damages, would no longer be entitled to obtain
large fees for little work, so filings quickly shifted out of Delaware and into
federal court.36
The primary reason for the Delaware courts’ skepticism was that
the supplemental disclosures in many cases addressed immaterial
details that did not aid stockholders in deciding whether to
approve a transaction.37
The Delaware Chancery Court, in essence, saw a need for immediate
reform, acknowledging that the plaintiffs’ bar had “created a real systemic

29. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 1,
22-23 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459.
30. Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, supra note 19, at 18.
31. Brief for the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, supra note 1, at 4, 12.
32. Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, supra note 19, at 18
(emphasis added).
33. Brief for the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, supra note 1, at 4.
34. Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, supra note 19, at 19.
35. Brief for the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, supra note 1, at 11.
36. Brief for the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association as Amicus Curiae at 1, 9,
Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp. (9th Cir. 2018), No. 18-459 (U.S. Nov. 13, 2018) [hereinafter Brief for
the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association]; Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the
United States of America, supra note 19, at 19.
37. Brief for the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association as Amicus Curiae at 1, 10,
Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d (9th Cir. 2018) cert. granted (U.S. Jan. 4, 2019) (No. 18-459).

258

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 15:2

problem.”38 Further, a Delaware Chancery Court Judge stated that “it just
can’t be that there are meaningful disclosure violations in every single
M&A case that’s being filed in this court.”39
The Trulia decision had an immediate impact, forcing class action
plaintiffs to switch tactics in the ‘merger objection’ litigation.40 For
example, in 2014, federal courts had forty merger objection lawsuits.41 In
2015, that number increased to forty-four merger objections.42 However,
following the Trulia decision, the number of merger objections more than
doubled in 2017, reaching 197 merger objection suits filed.43 It is critical
to note that the federal filings increase corresponds to a decrease in merger
objection lawsuits filed in Delaware.44 Now that the class action plaintiffs’
strategy turns to using the federal courts for merger objection lawsuits, the
following risks are created:
The Ninth Circuit’s mere negligence requirement will now
circumvent Trulia and capitalize on the Ninth Circuit’s lenient
negligence standard. This, coupled with the [1934] Exchange
Act’s liberal jurisdiction provision, encourages forum-shopping,
and risks creating a de facto negligence standard for all § 14(e)
cases.45
Essentially, the inconsistent application of Section 14(e) merger
objection standards will result in a de facto nationwide negligence standard
because plaintiffs’ lawyers would logically avoid bringing claims in the
more stringent, scienter standard jurisdiction.46 One only has to look at the
Ninth Circuit filings to see that this de facto nationwide standard will
almost certainly affect all future tender offers unless Varjabedian is
reversed.47
The Ninth Circuit has replaced the Delaware Chancery Court as the
preferred forum for merger objection suits.48 Varjabedian has only further
bolstered the view that the Ninth Circuit is plaintiff-friendly in the merger
objection context.49 This determination is strongly supported by the filing
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 12.
Brief for the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, supra note 1 at 12.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 14.
Brief for the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, supra note 1 at 18.
Id.
Id. at 14.
Frankel, supra note 16.
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numbers.50 From 2012 to 2014, only two merger objection suits were filed
in the Ninth Circuit, with eight filings in 2015.51 That number jumped to
twenty-five in 2016 and forty-one in 2017.52 Merger objection litigation is
only projected to grow in 2018, as twenty-two merger objection suits have
been filed in the Ninth Circuit during the first half of the year.53
By reversing the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Varjabedian, the Supreme
Court has an opportunity to avoid both perpetuating market inefficiencies
resulting from merger objection suits as well as preventing plaintiffs from
forum shopping and capitalizing on the de facto nationwide negligence
standard.54
C.

OVERVIEW OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S LEGAL ANALYSIS IN VARJABEDIAN

This section walks through the Ninth Circuit’s jurisprudence to
establish a framework to discuss the Court’s deviation in reasoning in
Varjabedian. The Varjabedian Court stated the following: “[W]e now hold
that Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act requires a showing of negligence,
not scienter.”55
[W]e are aware that our holding today parts ways from our
colleagues in five other circuits . . . However, . . . we are
persuaded that intervening guidance from the Supreme Court [i.e.,
re-analysis of opinions in Aaron (1980) and Ernst & Ernst (1976)]
. . . compels the conclusion that Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act
imposes a negligence standard.56
The first analytical test, and by far, the most focused upon throughout
the opinion by the Ninth Circuit was the plain meaning of the statute.57
The precise wording of Section 14(e) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of
a material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order
to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they are made, not misleading, or to engage in any

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Brief for the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, supra note 1, at 14.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 14–15.
Id. at 15.
Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d at 401.
Id. at 409–10.
Id. at 404.

260

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 15:2

fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in
connection with any tender offer.58
According to the Varjabedian Court, the use of the word “or” between
the two clauses is critical because such usage shows that there are two
different offenses proscribed by the statute; to construe the statute
otherwise would render it “hopelessly redundant” and declare one of the
clauses surplusage.59 Therefore, the court held ultimately, because the text
of the first clause of Section 14(e) does not suggest scienter is required, the
first clause of Section 14(e) only requires a showing negligence, not
scienter.60 The Ninth Circuit did review the leading cases in the other five
circuits that require a pleading of scienter for a Section 14(e) claim;
however, the opinion diplomatically suggests the statute has not heretofore
been read correctly in those other circuits.61
Beginning with the Second Circuit’s Chris-Craft decision in 1973
(“Chris-Craft”) and up through the Fifth Circuit’s Flaherty decision in
2009, five circuits have held that to state a claim under Section 14(e), one
must allege that the defendant acted with scienter.62 For example, the
Supreme Court held that a Rule 10b-5 violation requires scienter in Ernst &
Ernst in 1976.63 However, in Varjabedian, the Ninth Circuit held the better
analogy is between the first part of Section 14(e) and the “nearly identical
text” of Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.64 Further, “that is
significant because back in 1980, the Supreme Court held in Aaron Section
17(a)(2) does not require a showing of scienter.”65 Stated alternatively:
The net effect of Varjabedian is to make it easier for plaintiffs to
challenge tender offer disclosures. Already plaintiffs were using
14(d)(4) in an attempt to avoid having to plead scienter, but that
was an uncertain work-around, as many district courts had held
that 14(d)(4) does not provide a private right of action. From a
plaintiff’s point of view, having a negligence claim under 14(e)

58. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2012) (emphasis added).
59. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d at 404.
60. Id. at 408.
61. Id. at 409–10.
62. Bruce A. Ericson et al., Ninth Circuit: Enough to Allege Negligence When Attacking Tender
Offer Documents, PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.pillsbury
law.com/en/news-and-insights/enough-to-allege-negligence-when-attacking-tender-offer-documents.
html [perma.cc/3JPC-B9SS].
63. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d at 410.
64. Ericson, supra note 62.
65. Id.
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[courtesy of Varjabedian] is more than an even trade for losing the
opportunity to claim under 14(d)(4).66
The Roberts Court has, on average, selected approximately two
securities law cases per term.67 Further, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
demonstrated a willingness to grant certiorari in securities cases and
recently entered decisions either clarifying or limiting the scope of
securities class actions.68 The abovementioned factors all support the
Supreme Court’s granting of Emulex’s petition for certiorari on January 4,
2019.69 Accordingly, the Supreme Court should reverse the Ninth Circuit’s
holding in Varjabedian.70
The balance of this Article is as follows: Part II, the background of
Varjabedian, including basic facts and procedural steps in detail; Part III,
the legislative history of The Williams Act concerning tender offers, which
includes Section 14(e); Part IV, a review of the most significant case law
considered by the Ninth Circuit panel; Part V, an analysis of the Ninth
Circuit’s reasoning in Varjabedian; Part VI, a conclusion; and Part VII, an
appendix containing the relevant statutory provisions.

II. BACKGROUND
The Varjabedian dispute arose in February 2015 when two technology
firms, Emulex and Avago Technologies Wireless Manufacturing, Inc.,
sought to combine using a tender offer as the technique.71 Emulex
manufactured data center equipment (e.g., routers and network interface
cards) and Avago developed semiconductors.72 Avago, the prospective
acquiror would acquire the target, Emulex, via an Avago subsidiary,
Emerald Merger Sub. Inc.73
The merger was jointly announced on February 25, 2015, and would be
executed via an accepted tender offer.74 The tender offer occurred on April

66. Id.
67. Aaron F. Miner et al., Supreme Court Has Opportunity to Reexamine Implied Private Right of
Action Under Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act, Arnold & Porter (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.arnold
porter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2018/10/scotus-has-opportunity-to-reexamine [perma.cc/U92ZY84M].
68. Id.
69. Barnes, supra note 8.
70. Miner, supra note 67.
71. Ericson, supra note 62.
72. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 1,
6 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459.
73. Ericson, supra note 62.
74. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 1,
6 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459.
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7, 2015.75 Avago’s cash tender offer price of $8.00 for all outstanding
shares was a 26.4% premium over the pre-announcement share price (i.e.,
the market share price on the day before the merger was jointly
announced).76 Later that day, Emulex filed its SEC Recommendation
Statement, which included a total of nine reasons why the share price
tendered should be accepted by its shareholders, including that Emulex
shareholders would receive a premium on their stock.77
The next day on April 8, 2015, Emulex shareholder Gary Varjabedian,
sued, filing a putative federal class action in U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California.78 Varjabedian asserted 1934 Act claims
under Sections 14(e), 14(d)(4), and 20(a).79 In an effort to avoid a costly
discovery dispute, the target, Emulex, voluntarily provided Varjabedian
with core documents, including the so-called ‘Board Book’ that Goldman
Sachs had complied.80
However, the Board Book’s final page contained a graphic chart titled
“Selected Semiconductor Transactions,” (also referred to as the ‘Premium
Analysis’) which listed, based on publicly available information, the
premiums received in 17 transactions involving semiconductor companies
between 2010-2014.81 The chart did not provide any additional financial
analysis or further comparison apart from showing that Avago’s tender
offer consisting of a 26.4% share premium, while below average, fell
within the range of comparable transaction premiums.82
Varjabedian then amended his class action complaint seeking damages
and an order rescinding the merger transaction.83 Despite this, Avago’s
tender offer was close (i.e., only 60.58% of outstanding shares were
tendered),84 but ultimately successful and the merger between Avago and
Emulex was executed.85 In his amended complaint, Varjabedian claimed
the failure to include the single page Premium Analysis created the
materially misleading impression that the premium Emulex’s shareholders
75. Id. at 402.
76. Id. at 401.
77. Id. at 402.
78. Id.
79. Ericson, supra note 62.
80. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 1,
7 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459.
81. Id. at 402.
82. Id. at 402–03.
83. Id. at 409–10.
84. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), brief for the respondents
in opposition filed, 1, 4 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2018) No. 18-459.
85. John P. Stigi III & John M. Landry, Ninth Circuit Splits From Other Circuits, Holding That a
Negligence Standard Applies to a Claim Challenging Tender Offer Disclosures Under Section 14(e),
THE NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/ninth-circuit-spli
ts-other-circuits-holding-negligence-standard-applies-to-claim [https://perma.cc/XQ6M-ETZ9].
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received was significant, or at the least in line with premiums obtained in
similar transactions, as the tender offer was below market average.86
Varjabedian stated the following when describing the basis for the
amended complaint:
[T]he [Premium Analysis] did not cover one specific page from the
banker’s slide deck: a chart comparing the merger premium to that
of selected semiconductor transactions and showing that the
premium on this deal (allegedly 26.4 percent), while within the
range, was below the average (allegedly 50.8 percent).87
Emulex successfully argued for dismissal of the amended complaint,
arguing that the omitted information was publicly available and immaterial,
and that the plaintiff [was] required to plead scienter but had not.88 The
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California ultimately
dismissed Varjabedian’s amended complaint on the grounds that the
plaintiff’s 14(e) claim required pleading scienter and that a mere
negligence standard was insufficient.89 In the district court’s reasoning, the
court stated the following:
‘[N]o federal court has held that §14(e) requires only a showing of
negligence,’ and ‘the better view is that the similarities between
Rule 10b-5 and §14(e) require a plaintiff bringing a cause of action
under §14(e) to allege scienter,’ i.e., that [the] ‘defendants made
false or misleading statements either intentionally or with
deliberate recklessness.’90
Further, the district court held that the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act (“PSLRA”) unequivocally heightened pleading requirements
by requiring pleading facts evincing a strong inference of scienter.91 The
district court also dismissed the 14(d)(4) claim, stating that 14(d)(4) does
not allow for a private right of action.92

86. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 1,
8 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459.
87. Ericson, supra note 62.
88. Id.
89. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 1,
9 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459.
90. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 1,
9 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459.
91. Id.
92. Ericson, supra note 62.
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The key reasons for the district court’s holding are as follows: firstly,
nothing in the Premium Analysis contradicted the Recommendation
Statement; indeed, the chart simply reported that the Emulex premium was
below average for the industry but within a reasonable range of outcomes.93
Second, the tender offer price was also below average for the
semiconductor industry but still within a reasonable range.94 Moreover, the
district court stated the exclusion of the Premium Analysis was minor in
the entire scheme of the voluminous Goldman Sachs analysis,95 finding
there was a better explanation than fraud for defendants’ decision not to
include the chart.96 Finally, the district court held the plaintiff’s
allegations, even if accepted as true, failed to establish a “strong inference
of scienter,” which was required for proving Section 14(e) and proceeded
to dismiss Varjabedian’s amended complaint.97
Varjabedian then appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.98
The Ninth Circuit panel, consisting of Judges Graber, Murguia, and
Christen, affirmed the district court’s decision that Section 14(d)(4) does
not establish a private right of action.99 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit
Panel focused primarily on whether Section 14(e) requires a showing of
scienter or mere negligence.100
On April 20, 2018, the Ninth Circuit issued a published opinion
affirming the district court’s 14(d)(4) ruling, but reversing the district
court’s Section 14(e) scienter holding and stating that Section 14(e)
requires a showing of only negligence, not scienter.101
The Ninth Circuit noted that it chose to part ways from its colleagues in
five other circuits.102 Thereby, the Ninth Circuit currently, contradicts the
Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits’ rationales and
interpretations,103 and finds the other circuits erred in focusing on the

93. Id.
94. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 1,
9 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Danielle Myers, Ninth Splits with Five Sister Circuits in Holding that §14(e) Claims Require
Negligence, Not Scienter, to State a Claim, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (Apr. 23, 2018), https://
www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/securities/practice/2018/ninth-circuit-splits-withfive-sister-circuits/ [perma.cc/DRP6-R2WF].
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 1,
8–9 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459.
102. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 1,
9 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459.
103. Myers, supra note 98.
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shared text found in both Rule 10b-5 and Section 14(e).104 The shared text
between the two provisions is as follows:
[It is] unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of
material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they are made, not misleading.105
Instead, the Ninth Circuit explained that its holding that Section 14(e)
requires negligence rather than scienter is supported by the Williams Act,
relevant provisions of which will be discussed in the analysis section, see
infra.106 The court found that Section 14(e) places more emphasis on the
quality of the information shareholders receive in a tender offer than on the
state of mind harbored by those issuing a tender offer.107 The Ninth
Circuit’s reliance on a pure textual analysis108 was further justified by the
court’s view that two United States Supreme Court cases had undermined
the shared text argument.109
The first case, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, held Rule 10b-5 requires a
showing of scienter not because it uses language suggestive of intentional
wrongdoing, but because of its authorizing legislation, Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 78j(b), which permits the SEC to regulate
only scienter-based conduct.110 On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit
reasoned this rationale regarding Rule 10b-5 did not apply to Section 14(e),
as it is a statute, not an SEC Rule.111
The Ninth Circuit, also relied upon Aaron v. Securities & Exchange
Comm’n to support its holding.112 The Supreme Court analyzed Section
17(a)(2)of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2), as a statute
with nearly identical wording to Section 14(e)’s first clause, which did not
require a scienter.113 Thus, the Ninth Circuit held Section 14(e) only
104. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 1,
10 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459.
105. John P. Stigi III and John M. Landry, Ninth Circuit Splits From Other Circuits, Holding That
a Negligence Standard Applies to a Claim Challenging Tender Offer Disclosures Under Section 14(e),
THE NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/ninth-circuit-spli
ts-other-circuits-holding-negligence-standard-applies-to-claim [perma.cc/W2TW-YRCJ].
106. Id.
107. Myers, supra note 98.
108. Stigi III & Landry, supra note 105.
109. Id.
110. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Stigi III and Landry, supra note 107.
111. Varjabedian, 888 F.3d at 406 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 US 185, 193 (1976));
see also Miner, supra note 67.
112. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 407–08 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 1,
10 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) (No. 18-459).
113. Stigi III & Landry, supra note 107.

266

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 15:2

requires showing negligence.114 The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to
the district court to review Emulex’s motion to dismiss under a negligence,
instead of a scienter standard.115

III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WILLIAMS ACT
Prior to 1968, the Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”) and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”) left a regulatory loophole.116
Unlike many countries, which analyze the merit of a transaction, the United
States relies principally on a disclosure-based regime for regulating
securities transactions.117 United States policy prioritizes providing quality,
accurate information essential for at least two interrelated reasons: investor
protection and the health of capital markets.118 Hofstra Professor of Law,
Ronald Colombo, indicates that one only needs to relive the 2008-2009
global financial crisis to highlight the importance of accurate information
and pricing.119
Thus, the critical nature of information disclosure in the corporate
combination setting requires information and pricing disclosures under
both the 1933 Act (e.g., in a stock-for-stock exchange)120 and the 1934 Act
(e.g., under a more conventional statutory merger route).121 Despite
reporting requirements being in place, both the 1933 and the 1934 Acts still
failed to cover all efforts at seizing corporate control.122 This regulatory
gap123 became particularly apparent during the 1960’s when the United
States securities markets witnessed a wave of unannounced takeovers
carried out by corporate raiders, and which created a threat to managers and
shareholders, who were forced to make critical decisions under
unreasonable time pressure.124
A primary mechanism used by corporate raiders for executing these
unannounced takeovers were known as tender offers, which are publicly
announced offers to purchase the shares of a target company—as a means

114. Id.
115. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 410 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 1, 10
(U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) (No. 18-459).
116. Ronald J. Colombo, Effectuating Disclosure Under the Williams Act, 60 CATH. U. L. REV.
311, 315–16 (2011).
117. Id. at 313–14 (2011).
118. Id. at 314.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 315.
121. HAZEN, supra note 3, at 245.
122. COLOMBO, supra note 116, at 315.
123. HAZEN, supra note 3 at 245.
124. James Chen, Williams Act, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 31, 2018), https://www.investopedia.com/
terms/w/williamsact.asp.
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of effecting corporate combinations.125 Tender offers were unregulated,
“unlike conventional means of effecting takeovers such as mergers,
exchange offers, and proxy contests.”126 In its infancy, the tender offer was
primarily used for uncontested situations where the offeror and the target
were on friendly terms.127
Using a tender offer in an uncontested setting was viewed as favorable
because it reduced fees and expenses of the corporate combination when
compared with a traditional statutory merger.128 Additionally, uncontested
tender offers were employed by an issuer attempting to repurchase its own
shares.129 Tender offers continued to be primarily used in these types of
uncontested settings through the early 1960s, however, their usage quickly
evolved.130
In essence, the loopholes gained practical significance in the 1960s,
when the cash tender offer became a favored method of acquiring control
of publicly held corporations.131 To highlight both the scope and scale of
this evolution, only eight tender offers were initiated in 1960, but more
than 100 tender offers were initiated in 1966.132 Further, tender offers
began to be employed throughout a variety of settings, for example, to
obtain control of a corporation that is adverse to being taken over, to
acquire a company whose board of directors, although unopposed is not in
favor of sponsoring the acquisition, to gain control of a corporation before
a competing bid is perfected by a third party, and to save a company in
danger where a timely merger could not be made.133
This substantial increase in tender offers was due to several key
advantages over traditional takeover methods: (1) speed and efficiency, (2)
cheaper and reduced risk of unsuccessful takeover efforts, and (3) its
“secrecy and surprise” capabilities.134 The third key advantage is that the
target company is left virtually powerless to convince shareholders not to
sell their shares for above-market prices when the offeror’s identity is
concealed.135
The third key benefit was the most significant as it allowed the buyer to
accumulate large amounts of an issuer’s shares and to extend cash tender
125. HAZEN, supra note 3 at 245.
126. Neal I. Korval, Defining Tender Offers: Resolving a Decade of Dilemma, 54 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV., 520, 522 (1980).
127. Id. at 521.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See id.
131. COLOMBO, supra note 116, at 316.
132. KORVAL, supra note 126, at 521.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 523.
135. Id. at 523–24.
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offers, all in complete secrecy.136 Tender offers also typically comprised a
timing element that forced shareholders to operate on a compressed
timetable.137 Shareholders had minimal information about the offeror, and
were often required to make hurried decisions while lacking key
information which Congress always intended to be disclosed to
investors.138 While there were some defensive strategies to defend against
hostile takeovers (e.g., poison pills and Pac-Man defenses),139 many legal
scholars accepted the basic claim that most defensive tactics are overall
undesirable.140 Coupled with the continued lack of regulatory oversight, a
“war-like” takeover culture emerged, ultimately prompting Congressional
action by the late 1960s.141
In 1965, New Jersey Senator Harrison Williams led drafting reform
efforts to end the war-like takeover culture and began the fight to close the
loopholes.142 In doing so, Senator Williams’ draft legislation stated that:
[A]ny substantial accumulation of shares of a company registered
under the [1934 Securities Exchange] Act must be preceded by the
filing of public information . . . as this was the only way that
corporations, their stockholders, and employees [can] adequately
prepare in advance to meet the threat of the takeover specialist.143
Congress enacted Senator Williams’ legislation in 1968, known as the
Williams Act.144 The Williams Act amended the 1934 Act and introduced
Sections 13(d), 13(e), 14(d), 14(e) and 14(f) to the 1934 Act. Essentially,
Congress amended the 1934 Act by adopting the tender offer and takeover
provisions of the Williams Act.145
The Williams Act exclusively deals with transactions deemed to be a
tender offer, a term which is not defined in the Act itself.146 A variety of
tests have been put forth (e.g., the SEC’s eight-factor test) to determine
whether or not an offer qualifies as a tender offer.147 In Varjabedian, both

136. COLOMBO, supra note 116, at 316.
137. Dale A. Oesterle, Target Managers as Negotiating Agents for Target Shareholders in Tender
Offers: A Reply to the Passivity Thesis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 53, 55 (1985).
138. HAZEN, supra note 3.
139. Id.
140. OESTERLE, supra note 137, at 54.
141. HAZEN, supra note 3.
142. COLOMBO, supra note 116, at 316.
143. Id.
144. KORVAL, supra note 126, at 521–522.
145. HAZEN, supra note 3, at 246.
146. Thomas Hurst, The Regulation of Tender Offers in the United States and the United Kingdom:
Self-Regulation Versus Legal Regulation, 12 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 389, 394 (1987).
147. Id. at 395.
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parties are in accord that the dispute involves a tender offer and is subject
to the Williams Act.148 The Williams act is subject to one exception stated
as follows:
The [Williams Act] exception is that anyone who acquires over
five percent of any class of equity securities of a company subject
to the Act is required to file a disclosure statement with the SEC
and the target regardless of whether the acquisition is by way of
tender offer or otherwise.149
Legislative history indicates that Congress intended the Williams Act
to be neutral, and not to tip the balance of regulation in favor of the target
corporation or the offeror.150 Further, the legislative history highlights a
primary Congressional goal, largely due to Senator Williams’ intent, to
close regulatory loopholes by requiring the disclosure of pertinent
information to stockholders when a corporation undergoes a potential
acquisition by a cash tender offer or through open market or privately
negotiated purchases of securities.151
For the purposes of this Article, this author will provide a brief
overview of the amended sections and then provide detailed analysis
relating to section 14(e) as it is directly relevant to Varjabedian. In contrast
to other provisions of the Williams Act, 1934 Act Section 14(e) applies to
any tender offer using an instrumentality of interstate commerce, even if
the target company is not subject to the Exchange Act’s registration and
reporting requirements.152
Section 13(d) relates to the appropriate form for 1934 Act filings
regarding disclosure requirements about the firm, its officers, directors, and
principal business, as well as any financing arrangements that have been
entered into to finance the purchase.153 Section 13(e) of the 1934 Act
makes it unlawful for issuers, subject to the 1934 Exchange Act’s
registration requirements, to purchase their own shares in contravention of
SEC rules.154 Section 14(d) requires any person planning a ‘tender offer’
for any class of equity security subject to the Exchange Act’s registration
and reporting requirements file with the Commission all solicitations,
advertisements, or other material used in connection with the tender

148. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 888 F.3d 399, 402–
03 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. pending, (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459.
149. Hurst, supra note 146, at 394.
150. Hurst, supra note 146, at 391.
151. Id.
152. HAZEN, supra note 3, at 247–48.
153. Id. at 248.
154. Id. at 246.
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offer.155 Section 14(e) contains an anti-fraud provision, which the author
will examine in detail, see infra.156 Section 14(f) addresses public
disclosure requirements on the applicable SEC filing forms.157

IV. MOST SIGNIFICANT CASE LAW: DETERMINING
WHETHER SECTION 14(E) REQUIRES A PLEADING OF
SCIENTER OR MERE NEGLIGENCE
Prior to examining the Ninth Circuit’s reversal of the district court’s
14(e) holding, it is necessary to understand the significant tender offer case
law and its historical development leading up to Varjabedian.
A. CASE SUMMARIES
i. Chris-Craft Industries v. Piper Aircraft Corporation (“Chris-Craft”) – Second
Circuit (1973)

The Second Circuit laid the groundwork for defining the scope, as well
as the principles to apply when analyzing Section 14(e), in Chris-Craft
Industries v. Piper Aircraft Corporation (“Chris-Craft”).158 In 1968 to
1969, both Chris-Craft Industries (“CCI”) and Bangor Punta Corporation
(“BPC”) initiated financing efforts in an attempt to each individually
acquire Piper Aircraft Corporation, which culminated in instant
litigation.159
In Chris-Craft, CCI’s and BPC’s tender offers led CCI and BPC to
own forty-one percent and forty-five percent, respectively, of the
outstanding Piper Shares.160 CCI eventually withdrew from the power
struggle leaving BPC to purchase 100,614 shares in order to gain majority
control of Piper Aircraft.161 CCI’s unsuccessful tender offer attempt cost
the firm more than $44 million.162

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 248.
See id.
HAZEN, supra note 3, at 249.
Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 349 (1973).
Id. at 350.
Id. at 354.
Id. at 354–55.
Id.
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CCI then initiated suit, claiming, inter alia, each defendant violated
Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, due to a joint PiperBPC press release which stated that BPC was acquiring the Piper family’s
stock holdings through a tender exchange offer for a package of BPC
securities. The release contained a statement that BPC would offer to the
remaining Piper shareholders a package of BPC securities valued in the
judgment of First Boston “at not less than $80 per Piper share,” which was
later reported by the President of BPC, David W. Wallace, to a Wall Street
Journal reporter.163 However, some BPC’s purchases, were conducted
ultimately for less than $80.00, made during the pendency of an exchange
offer for the purchased shares, further driving up the share price.164
The Second Circuit ultimately held that 14(e) was violated.165 In doing
so, the Second Circuit reviewed Section 14(e)’s accompanying Senate
Report, stating the Report indicated clearly and more specifically than Rule
10b-5 that Section 14(e) was intended to apply the long established
antifraud proscriptions of the federal securities laws to a tender offer.166
When reviewing the district court’s analysis, the Second Circuit held
the various communications to Piper shareholders, including the press
release by Piper and BPC did not violate 14(e).167 However, the Second
Circuit, in reversing the lower court’s Section 14(e) holding acknowledged
Section 14(e) was relatively new, and therefore had not been the subject of
extensive judicial construction, and never in the context of the factual
situation here presented.168
However, the Second Circuit has held that the underlying proscription
of Section 14(e) was virtually identical to Rule 10b-5; with the critical
difference of the latter applicable only in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security, while the former is applicable in connection with any
tender offer.169
Accordingly, the Chris-Craft court held Section 14(e) requires scienter
via the principles developed under Rule 10b-5.170 In short, the Second
Circuit held a violation of Section 14(e) requires a material misstatement or
omission concerned with a tender offer, and that such misstatement or
omission was sufficiently culpable to justify granting relief to the injured
party.171
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168.
169.
170.
171.

Chris-Craft Industries, 480 F.2d at 354.
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ii. Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co. – Fifth Circuit (1974)

In the Fifth Circuit, Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co. (“Smallwood”),
the court found a scienter requirement for a 14(e) violation and further
raised multiple questions under the 1934 Act.172
The plaintiff-appellant, Joe L. Smallwood, brought several claims
following a tender offer, including claims under the Williams Act.173 The
dispute arose in 1968 when Pearl Brewing, Defendant-Appellee, began to
look for a suitable merger partner to diversify its product portfolio.174
Eventually three merger candidates were identified, and Pearl Brewing
ultimately selected a company called Zapata.175
However, during the tender offer process, Pearl’s Board failed to
inform Pearl shareholders the merger with Zapata could be consummated
without an underwriting commitment and without the ten-day period in
which to tender their shares.176 Pearl shareholders filed suit alleging the
defendants omitted material facts; and these failures constituted fraud or
deceit upon the Pearl shareholders.177
Ultimately, the jury in the district court found that Pearl’s failure to
inform constituted material omissions.178 On appeal, the issue was whether
the district court erred by not ruling that the defendants violated Section
14(e) and Rule 10b-5.179 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court citing
Chris-Craft and further aligning with the Second Circuit’s elemental
analysis.180 In doing so, the Fifth Circuit stated if Section 14(e) and Rule
10b-5’s analyses are identical the scienter standard applies, and liability in
a private action for damages has apparently never been imposed for
negligent conduct under Rule 10b-5.181
iii. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder – Supreme Court (1976)
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder (“Ernst & Ernst”) addresses whether an
action for civil damages may lie under 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b5 in the absence of an allegation of intent to deceive, manipulate, or

172.
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Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 584 (1974).
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defraud on the part of the defendant.182 In this case, First Securities hired
Ernst & Ernst, an accounting firm, to audit documents in connection with
SEC filings (e.g., 10-K reports).183 Ernst and Ernst was an opportunity for
the Supreme Court to directly address whether Rule 10b-5 could include
both a negligence and a scienter standard.184
The respondents, Olga Hochfelder, et. al. (“Hochfelder”), invested in a
fraudulent securities scheme where the president of the firm and owner of
ninety-two percent of its stock induced the respondents to invest in escrow
accounts that the president claimed had a high return rate.185 However, in
reality, it was discovered that there were no escrow accounts.186
Hochfelder then sued claiming (1) the escrow scheme violated Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and (2) that Ernst & Ernst had aided and abetted the
company’s violations by its failure to conduct proper audits of First
Securities and as revealed through discovery, the respondents’ cause of
action rested on a theory of negligence.187 The SEC argued that
subsections (b) and (c) of Rule 10b-5 are worded such that, when standing
alone, the subsections could encompass both intentional and negligent
behavior.188
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision that both
intentional and negligent behavior could be encompassed within Rule 10b5 finding that such a reading could not be harmonized with the
administrative history of Rule 10b-5.189 While the Supreme Court
conceded that subsection (b)’s and subsection (c)’s language, could be read
as proscribing, respectively, any type of material misstatement or omission,
and any course of conduct, that has the effect of defrauding investors,
whether the wrongdoing was intentional or not.190
Further, the Supreme Court held such a reading of encompassing
negligence cannot be harmonized with Rule 10b-5’s administrative history,
which made it clear Rule 10b-5 was intended to apply only to activities that
involved scienter191 Put simply, when a statute speaks so specifically in
terms of manipulation and deception, most will understand this
terminology as intentional wrongdoing.192
182.
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Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 187–88 (1976).
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Accordingly, the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst, largely due to a lack
of expansive intent, was unwilling to extend the statute’s scope to negligent
conduct.193
iv. Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc. – Sixth Circuit (1980)

In Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc. (“Adams”), the appellees
brought a class action suit under the 1934 Act.194 Chadbourn, Inc., a North
Carolina-based hosiery manufacturer, and Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., a
Tennessee-based textile manufacturer, sought to merge.195 A class action
lawsuit followed based on the Appellees arguing that an allegedly false
proxy solicitation was used to get the shareholder approval necessary for
Standard Knitting and Chadbourne, Inc. to merge.196
Standard’s
management stated their recommendation to merge with Chadbourn, Inc.,
in the proxy statement.197
The key issue in Adams was whether the failure to mention certain
restrictions on the payment of dividends by the acquiring corporation,
applied to preferred as well as common stock in the proxy statement, was a
negligent error.198 In its analysis, the Sixth Circuit reviewed the
congressional intent and Section 14(e)’s language, focusing on the
Williams Act.199 The Sixth Circuit found the Williams Act’s language
clearly demonstrates Congress envisioned scienter to be an element of
14(e) analysis.200 The Sixth Circuit determined scienter was the correct
standard given Congress’ use of ‘fraudulent,’ ‘deceptive,’ and
‘manipulative’ and in light of the Ernst & Ernst holding, that 14(e) analysis
requires a showing of scienter.201 Thus, in reversing the district court’s
decision in Adams, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that scienter is
the required mental state for Section 14(e), based on congressional intent.
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v. Aaron v. Securities and Exchange Commission – Supreme Court (1980)
A month following the Adams decision, the Supreme Court addressed
the issue of whether the SEC is required to establish scienter as an element
of a civil enforcement action to enjoin violations of Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”) and Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act in
Aaron v. SEC (“Aaron”).202 In Aaron, the petitioner, an employee
manager, of a registered broker-dealer in New York made false statements
regarding due diligence documents.203 Here, the manager made false
statements relating to a company, Lawn-A-Mat, a lawn-care equipment
franchisor and supplier.204 The false statements concerned files relating to
Lawn-A-Mat’s deteriorating financial condition and revealed no plans for
manufacturing a new car and tractor.205 Importantly, no corrective
measures were taken to prevent the manager from making further false
statements to clients.206
The SEC then filed a complaint in the Southern District of New York
against the petitioner for, inter alia, violating Section 17(a) of the 1933
Act.207 The SEC alleged that the manager knew or had reason to know that
the employees under his supervision engaged in fraudulent practices, but
failed to take adequate steps to prevent those practices from continuing.208
The relevant provisions of Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act are as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any
securities by the use of any means or instruments of transportation
or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the
mails, directly or indirectly . . . (2) to obtain money or property by
means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading.209
Citing Ernst & Ernst, the Aaron court held the language and history of
Section 10(b) did not require a showing of scienter in an injunction
enforcement action brought by the Commission under Section 17(a)(2).210
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The majority in Aaron reasoned that the Ernst & Ernst decision was
consistent with such a holding since it addressed a Commission
enforcement action for injunctive relief and Ernst & Ernst was a private
cause of action.211 Put simply, with regards to Section 10(b), the Supreme
Court majority held scienter is a necessary element of a violation of Section
10(b).212
However, regarding whether scienter was required to prove a Section
17(a)(2) claim, the Supreme Court relied largely on congressional intent,
stating a negligence standard is sufficient to support an injunction.213 In
support, the Court relied upon congressional intent, finding securities
legislation enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds should not be
construed technically or restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial
purposes.214 The Supreme Court held nothing on the face of 17(a)(2)
necessitates a finding of both scienter or intent to defraud.215
The majority also examined Sections 20(b) and 21(d) and determined
that nothing on the face of either provision nor contrary legislative history
imposed an independent requirement of scienter.216 Section 17(a)(1)
requires scienter, but scienter is not required for a finding under Section
17(a)(2) or 17(a)(3).217
The concurring opinion instead held sound reasons are available to
distinguish between private damages and public enforcement actions under
these statutes, and therefore, apply a scienter standard for private damages
actions.218 For example, the general tenor of state securities laws was cited
as it pertains to equitable relief. Moreover, this notion was further
reinforced via the Concurring Justices issuing a reminder that the Supreme
Court was examining equity practice requirements, which consisted of
several centuries of development.219
Justice Blackmun’s dissent conceded the history, statutory structure,
legislative purpose, and policy suggested injunctive relief did not require
scienter per Section 17(a) and Section 10(b).220 Justice Blackmun further
relied upon Congress’s prior approval of scienter’s use in both private
damages and public enforcement actions to diminish the importance of a
preliminary scienter finding.221 Put simply, scienter should apply for all
211.
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214.
215.
216.
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Section 17 provisions in a private right of action and a negligence standard
may apply only for Section 17 SEC enforcement actions when the statue
and relevant case law is interpreted in its respective context.222
vi. Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Fluor Corp. – Second Circuit (1987)

The Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Fluor Corp. (“Connecticut Nat.”) arose
out of Fluor Corp.’s tender offer for St. Joe’s Mineral Corporation.223 On
May 4, 1981, the Plaintiff Appellants, Connecticut Nat. Bank (“CNB”),
bought 39,000 St. Joe Shares from Hartford Steam Boiler Company.224
However, that number of shares represented the number that Fluor, by
virtue of the proration requirements of the Williams Act, would have
purchased if CNB tendered the 50,000 shares before midnight on April
15.225 When CNB later resold the shares following Flour’s expiration date,
the firm suffered a net loss in excess of $550,000.226
CNB then brought claims under Sections 14(d) and 14(e) of the 1934
Act, alleging Fluor’s failure to print the oversubscription restriction in the
same paragraph with, and in the same size print as, the May 1, 1981,
expiration date of the tender offer, and its failure in other ways to
emphasize that restriction, constituted misstatements and omissions of
material facts in the description of the tender offer in violation of the
Williams Act.227 Further, CNB stated shareholders were misled by the
offer, alleging scienter stating the following:
Fluor intended to mislead the Shareholders or their agents,
commercial banks or custodians by the aforesaid misstatements
and omissions, or knew or should have known that the
misstatements and omissions would mislead and confuse the
shareholders or their agents, commercial banks, or custodians and
acted recklessly and wantonly in communicating the terms of the
offer.228
The district court dismissed this Williams Act claim since CNB’s
allegations of scienter failed to comply with Rule 9(b) requirements.229
The Second Circuit upholding the district court’s holding, further dismissed

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id. at 712.
Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Fluor Corp., 808 F.2d 957, 958 (1987).
Id. at 959–60.
Id.
Id. at 960.
Id.
Id.
Connecticut Nat. Bank, 808 F.2d at 959.
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the above claim, emphasizing that scienter was a necessary element for a
damages claim under Section 14(e).230 Moreover, the Second Circuit
reiterated that the same principles for determining scienter under Rule 10b5 apply likewise to Section 14(e).231
vii. In re Digital Island Securities Litigation – Third Circuit (2004)

In re Digital Island Securities Litigation (“Digital Island”), former
shareholders of Digital Island, Inc., an e-commerce provider as well as the
acquired corporation here, brought a class action lawsuit against the
company.232 Cable & Wireless PLC’s (“C & W”) acquired Digital Island,
Inc., via a tender offer which resulted in C & W purchasing eighty percent
of Digital Island’s outstanding shares.233 In May 2001, Digital Island
announced that it entered into an agreement to provide certain business
services to Microsoft, increasing Digital Islands’ share price from $2.00 to
$3.69 per share.234
Three days later, the Digital Island board unanimously voted to
approve the merger and to recommend that shareholders accept the tender
offer price of $3.40.235 However, Digital Island announced two significant
business deals immediately following the tender offer’s expiration.236 The
two business deals were with (1) Bloomberg LP and (2) Major League
Baseball (“MLB”).237 Based on this announcement, and immediately
following C & W’s tender offer, Digital Island, Inc., shareholders filed a
class action suit under Section 14(e).238 The shareholders claimed that both
“the Bloomberg and MLB deals had substantial value to Digital Island,
and, if disclosed, would have substantially influenced the shareholders’
decision to tender their shares.”239
In affirming the district court’s decision, the Third Circuit held, citing
Ernst & Ernst, that Section 14(e) was modeled on the antifraud provisions
of Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 and therefore also
required proof of scienter.240 The Third Circuit reasoned that courts
historically have construed both Sections 14(e) and 10(b) consistently

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id. at 961.
Id.
In re Digital Island Securities Litigation, 357 F.3d 322, 324–25 (2004).
Id. at 325.
Id.
Id. at 325–26.
Id. at 326.
In re Digital Island, 357 F.3d at 326.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 328.
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because of the similarity in the language and scope of Section 14(e) and
Rule 10b-5.241
viii. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Ginsburg – Eleventh Circuit (2004)

SEC v. Ginsburg (“Ginsburg”) arose from a suspect trading pattern that
occurred.242 Family members made several trades following multiple
phone calls from a principal relaying alleged tips related to a tender
offer.243 The allegations alleged that Ginsburg told his brother, Mark
Ginsburg, and his father, Jordan Ginsburg, material nonpublic information
relating to two merging companies, EZ Communications, Inc., and Katz
Media Group, and that Mark and Jordan had traded on EZ stock using that
information.244
The SEC brought a civil enforcement action against Ginsberg.245 In
reversing the district court’s holding, the Eleventh Circuit held, pursuant to
Aaron that to establish liability under Section 10(b) and Section 14(e) and
accompanying Rules 10b-5 and 14e-3, the SEC must prove that Ginsburg
acted with scienter.246
The Eleventh Circuit reasoned the factors would be rendered
meaningless if no injunction was entered where every factor weighed in
favor of an injunction, as was the case in Ginsberg.247 Accordingly, the
district court’s judgment was reversed and remanded with instructions to
enjoin Scott Ginsburg from future violations of the securities laws.248
ix. Flaherty & Crumrine Preferred Income Fund, Inc. v. TXU Corp. – Fifth Circuit
(2009)

Flaherty & Crumrine Preferred Income Fund, Inc. v. TXU Corp.
(“Flaherty”) arose out of a class action by convertible securities holders
responding to a tender offer.249 The corporation, TXU, and its CEO, Stan
Haiduk (“Haiduk”), allegedly were aware of an imminent dividend increase
at the time of share repurchase.250 The appellants alleged that TXU and
Haiduk made material misrepresentations and omissions of fact in
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
2009).
250.

Id.
S.E.C. v. Ginsburg, 362 F.3d 1292, 1295 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1297.
Ginsburg, 362 F.3d. at 1305.
Id.
Flaherty & Crumrine Preferred Income Fund, Inc. v. TXU Corp., 565 F.3d 200, 200 (5th Cir.
Id.
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connection with a self-tender offer to purchase certain convertible TXU
securities by the tender offer in 2004.251 Also, the appellants brought fraud
claims under Section 10(b) and 14(e) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5.252
The claims were based on the premise that appellees fraudulently
misrepresented the timing and magnitude of a planned stock repurchase
program and dividend increase to induce participation in the tender offer.253
The district court dismissed the above claims, requiring a showing of
scienter and not mere negligence.254
The Fifth Circuit, affirmed the district court’s scienter requirement, and
held plaintiffs must allege a misstatement or an omission of a material fact
made with scienter on which the plaintiffs relied that proximately caused
the plaintiff’s injury.255 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit, citing Smallwood,
found scienter is required for Section 14(e) claims because of the identical
elemental nature of Rule 10b-5 and Section 14(e).256
x. In re Tangoe, Inc. Stockholders Litigation – D.C. Conn. (2018)
In 2018, shareholders filed a consolidated class action against Tangoe,
a global telecom and expense management corporation, and its Board of
Directors in the District Court for the District of Connecticut alleging 1934
Act violations following a tender offer.257 The class action shareholders
alleged that Tangoe and its Board intentionally made misstatements and
omitted material information from the Recommendation Statement to
induce stockholders to participate in the tender offer for their own personal
gain.258
The district court found the claimants failed to state a claim for
violation of the statute making it unlawful to engage in any fraudulent,
deceptive or manipulative practice in connection with the tender offer.259
In so holding, the district court examined Section 14(e)’s requirements:
(1) [D]efendant misrepresented or omitted … material facts in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security; (2) the
shareholders relied to their detriment upon the misrepresentations

251.
2009).
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Flaherty & Crumrine Preferred Income Fund, Inc. v. TXU Corp., 565 F.3d 200, 203 (5th Cir.
Id. at 203.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 207.
Flaherty, 565 F.3d at 207.
In re Tangoe, Inc. Stockholders Litigation, 333 F. Supp. 3d 77, 77 (2018).
Id. at 80.
Id. at 77.
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or omissions; and (3) the misrepresentations or omissions were
made with scienter.260
Thus, in In re Tangoe, Inc. (“Tangoe.”) the plaintiffs did not satisfy the
above scienter requirement.261 The district court, in citing Aaron, also
acknowledged, as the Ninth Circuit did in Varjabedian, that Section
17(a)(2) of the 1933 Act and the first clause of Section 14(e) contain nearidentical wording, but found that reasoning ultimately unpersuasive.262 In
support of its position, the district court held:
While the Ninth Circuit has abandoned the requirement of pleading
scienter for claims under Section 14(e), neither the Supreme
Court—since its decision in Aaron considered Section 17(a)(2) of
the Securities Act, not Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act—nor the
Second Circuit has abandoned scienter as an element of pleading a
claim under Section 14(e), and this Court therefore will continue to
apply the current law in this Circuit.263
The Tangoe court further relied upon a previous case in its own district,
Sodhi,264 which held scienter was an independently sufficient ground to
grant a motion to dismiss.265 In addition, the Tangoe opinion reiterated the
requirements to satisfy a Section 14(e) claim: (1) Defendants
misrepresented or omitted to state material facts in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security; (2) the shareholders relied to their detriment
upon the misrepresentations or omissions; and (3) the misrepresentations or
omissions were made with scienter.266
Accordingly, the district court held, even in light of the Ninth Circuit’s
ruling in Varjabedian, a showing of scienter, not mere negligence, is
required to successfully plead a Section 14(e) claim.267

V. ANALYSIS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S HOLDING IN
VARJABEDIAN
The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Varjabedian rests, for the scope of this
Article, on three key premises: (1) Section 14(e)’s text is disjunctive and
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

Id. at 98.
Id. at 99.
Id. at 107.
In re Tangoe, 333 F. Supp. 3d at 107.
Sodhi v. Gentium S.p.A., No. 14-CV-287 JPO, at 1, 1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2015).
In re Tangoe, 333 F. Supp. 3d at 107.
Id.
Id.
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renders two separate and distinct clauses; (2) under the isolated language of
Section 14(e)’s first clause, as analyzed in Ernst & Ernst and Aaron, a
pleading of negligence, not scienter, is sufficient under Section 14(e); and
(3) Emulex’s concerns regarding the creation of a de facto negligence
standard are unfounded.268 The Conclusion section of the Ninth Circuit’s
opinion states the following:
We are aware that our holding today parts ways from our
colleagues in five other circuits. However, . . . we are persuaded
that intervening guidance from the Supreme Court compels the
conclusion that Section 14(e) of the [1934] Exchange Act imposes
a negligence standard. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district
court’s decision as to the Section 14(e) claim [emphasis in
original].269
Regarding the text of Section 14(e), the Ninth Circuit’s justification for
its holding, closely aligns with the Appellant’s Appellate and Supreme
Court briefs.270 The Ninth Circuit relied heavily on a plain reading of
Section 14(e).271 In so doing, the Ninth Circuit states that a purely textual
interpretation readily divides the Section 14(e) into two clauses, each
proscribing different conduct.272 In Varjabedian, the court focused on the
“or”:
It shall be unlawful for any person [1] to make any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state any material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or [2]
to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or
practices, in connection with any tender offer.273
The Varjabedian opinion finds Section 14(e) proscribes two different
offenses.274 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit solely relies on the plain language

268. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), brief for the respondents
in opposition filed, 1, 2 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2018) No. 18-459.
269. Id. at 409–10, cert. pending, (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459.
270. Id. at 405–06, cert. pending, (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459; see also Id. at 409–10.
271. Id. at 407–08.
272. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 888 F.3d 399, 404
(9th Cir. 2018), cert. pending, (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459.
273. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 888 F.3d 399, 404
(9th Cir. 2018), cert. pending, (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459, (emphasis and numbering added to
statutory language).
274. Id.
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meaning to predominate the statutory interpretation analysis.275 Thus, the
use of the word “or” separating the two clauses in Section 14(e) shows that
there are two distinct offenses that the statute proscribes.276 To hold
otherwise, according to the Ninth Circuit, would be an improper statutory
interpretation.277
Stated alternatively, a purely textual interpretation supposedly permits
the Ninth Circuit to view the first clause of Section 14(e) in isolation.278
Thus, removing the preliminary clause away from its appropriate Section
14(e) context is supposedly appropriate statutory interpretation.279 Further,
the Ninth Circuit then relates the preliminary clause to materially
indistinguishable text from other contexts to hold that the first clause, not
its second, only requires a pleading of negligence, not scienter.280
On balance, the Ninth Circuit’s textual interpretation of Section 14(e)
is flawed.281 While, statutory interpretation does begin with the plain
language, it certainly does not end there.282 Context is a primary
determinant of meaning.283 In addition, the Supreme Court has consistently
stressed the importance of reading a statute holistically and avoiding
construing statutory phrases in isolation.284
In essence, statutory provisions are not hermetically sealed off from the
rest of the same sentence.285 In Chris-Craft, the Supreme Court already
stated that Section 14(e) is modeled on the antifraud provisions of Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.286 Accordingly, Section 14(e) is an antifraud
prohibition, not a negligence prohibition.287
A review of the legislative history is also necessary to place Section
14(e) in its appropriate context.288 When constructing Section 14(e):
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 404–05.
278. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 1,
16-17 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459.
279. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), brief for the respondents
in opposition filed, I, I (U.S. Nov. 30, 2018) No. 18-459.
280. Id.
281. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 1,
17 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459.
282. Id.
283. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 167, 174 (2012).
284. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 1,
17 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459.
285. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), reply brief for the
petitioners filed, 1, 9 (U.S. Dec. 18, 2018) No. 18-459.
286. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 1,
18 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459.
287. Id.
288. Id.
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Congress used a number of words—‘fraudulent,’ ‘deceptive,’ and
‘manipulative’—that undeniably ‘connote . . . intentional or willful
conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors’—‘a type of
conduct quite different from negligence.’289
When conducting statutory interpretation, words are known by the
company they keep.290 Thus, an examination of the legislative history is
also critical to conduct a thorough textual interpretation.291 The language
Congress selected for 14(e) cannot merely be read in isolation because
words in the same sentence, as is the case with Section 14(e)’s
construction, were intended to have the same connotation. This is
particularly true, however, in Varjabedian, as ignoring those neighbors
would give “unintended breadth” to the Acts of Congress.292
The Respondents, claim a negligence standard applies because Section
14(e)’s text is unambiguous, yet they later cut against their own proposition
by stating that Section 14(e) does not expressly require any specific state of
mind.293 Per Congress’ perspective, the scienter element is viewed as so
critical in the securities law context that they added a special, heightened
pleading standard for it in the PSLRA of 1985.294
In conclusion of the first premise, the Ninth Circuit’s failure to
properly read Section 14(e) in its proper context, does not justify the
departure from the otherwise uniform precedent on this issue across the
country for the half-century since enactment of Section 14(e).295
The Ninth Circuit’s second premise is based on two decades-old
Supreme Court decisions, lending particular focus on a 1976 decision
where the Supreme Court did conclude Rule 10b-5 required scienter as the
SEC has the authority to regulate manipulative or deceptive practices.296 In
short, the Ninth Circuit does not lend appreciable weight to the SEC
context versus a private right of action and, accordingly, misapplies Ernst
& Ernst. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit then stated the rationale regarding
Rule 10b-5 does not apply to Section 14(e), which is a statute, not an SEC
Rule.297 The Ninth Circuit panel asserts Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities
289. Id. at 17.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), reply brief for the
petitioners filed, 1, 9 (U.S. Dec. 18, 2018) No. 18-459.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 5.
296. Miner, supra note 67.
297. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 888 F.3d 399, 409
(9th Cir. 2018), cert. pending, (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459.
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Act of 1933—and the first clause of Section 14(e), contain nearly identical
wording.298 Both sections prohibit any untrue statement of a material fact
or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements not misleading.299
The Ninth Circuit does, and quite compellingly so from a surface-level
analysis, state that the first clause’s text is devoid of any suggestion of a
scienter requirement.300 Section 17(a)(2) appears in the 1933 Act whereas
Section 14(e) appears in the 1934 Act, citing their own circuit stating,
“statues dealing with similar subjects should be interpreted
harmoniously.”301 The Ninth Circuit’s argument is this similarity in
wording, irrespective of context, supposedly supports the proposition that
Section 14(e) only requires a mere negligence showing because Aaron held
that Section 17(a)(2) does not require a showing of scienter.302
The Ninth Circuit’s reliance on both Ernst & Ernst and Aaron is
misplaced.303 Essentially, the source of the confusion stems from the Ninth
Circuit believing that Ernst & Ernst was significant because of its
statement that the text of Rule 10b-5—on which Section 14(e) was
modeled—could be read as proscribing, respectively, “any type of material
misstatement or omission . . . whether the wrongdoing was intentional or
not.”304
However, the Ernst & Ernst dicta pertaining to Rule 10b-5’s text, does
not necessarily compel finding that any inferred right of action should
necessarily extend to negligence.305 The Ninth Circuit further did not
account for the fact that Section 14(e) must be read as a whole, and in light
of its antifraud objective.306 The central holding in Ernst & Ernst was that
both the legislative histories of the 1933 and 1934 Acts highlight the
following takeaway:
The Ninth Circuit missed the central teaching of Ernst & Ernst:
that the statutory scheme enacted by Congress in the 1933 and
1934 Acts strongly compels the conclusion that Congress would
not have intended a private cause of action for mere negligence in
the absence of the ‘significant procedural restrictions’ that it
298. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 406 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct.
782, 202 L. Ed. 2d 511 (2019).
299. Id.
300. Id. at 16.
301. Id. at 12.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 13.
304. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 1,
20 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459.
305. Id. at 21.
306. Id.
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imposed for the express causes of actions it created that cover
negligent behavior . . . That applies equally to Section 14(e).307
The Ninth Circuit’s reliance on Aaron and Section 17(a)(2) is
misguided.308 In Aaron, the Supreme Court held that Section 17(a)(2) of
the 1933 Act did not require a showing of scienter.309 The Second Circuit
has and continues to apply a scienter standard even in light of the very
cases the Ninth Circuit claims question continuing viability of the
foundation for Chris-Craft and the cases that followed it, all requiring
scienter.310
Further, and perhaps most convincingly, in Aaron the SEC was not
pursuing a damages remedy under an inferred cause of action, but instead
proceeded under an express public cause of action, contained in Section
20(b) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b), which authorizes injunctive
relief.311
Aaron involved an express cause of action.312 Therefore, the principles
that restrain judicial creation of an implied private remedy did not apply.313
Moreover, because Aaron only involved a request for injunctive relief, the
additional limits that have traditionally applied to securing damages for
alleged fraud did not apply.314 Hence, the negligence standard can be
summarized as follows:
Aaron’s holding that a finding of scienter is unnecessary for
issuance of an injunction in a suit brought by the SEC under the
express cause of action for violations of Section 17(a) therefore
by no means suggests that scienter is unnecessary to secure
damages or other relief pursuant to any implied private right
of action based on Section 14(e). In any event, the fact that the
Ninth Circuit read . . . [the Supreme] . . . Court’s decisions to
require creation of an expansive private remedy for negligence
that had been rejected by every other court to consider it just

307. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 1,
21 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459 (emphasis added).
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), reply brief for the
petitioners filed, 1, 4 (U.S. Dec. 18, 2018) No. 18-459.
311. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 1,
21 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459.
312. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), reply brief for the
petitioners filed, 1, 4 (U.S. Dec. 18, 2018) No. 18-459.
313. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 1,
21–22 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459.
314. Id.
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Applying Chris-Craft and Smallwood, the Fifth Circuit followed the
Second Circuit in requiring the same elements to establish a violation of
either Section 14(e) or Rule 10b-5.316
The Ninth Circuit claims that it is obvious that Chris-Craft is
inconsistent with Ernst & Ernst and Aaron.317 However, the Ninth Circuit
is just arguing the merits. Further, the Second Circuit declared, years after
Aaron and Ernst & Ernst, that it remained well settled in the Second
Circuit that scienter is a necessary element of a claim for damages under
Section 14(e).318 Sodhi, is also instructive here, stating the following:
[T]he Ninth Circuit has abandoned the requirement of pleading
scienter for claims under Section 14(e) . . . [N]either the Supreme
Court . . . nor the Second Circuit has abandoned scienter as an
element . . . under Section 14(e), and this Court therefore will
continue to apply the current law in [the Second] Circuit . . .
because the Second Circuit has squarely held that scienter is
required under Section 14(e).319
In light of these facts, the Ninth Circuit’s statement in Varjabedian
that they were unsure how recent case law impacts the instant case,320 is
misguided and shows an unjustified willingness to dismiss long held
precedent that had existed since enactment of Section 14(e).321
The third and final key premise for the scope of this Article highlights
the Ninth Circuit’s failure to fully appreciate the substantial risks that a
Varjabedian-type circuit split would foster. The Varjabedian opinion, in
addition to creating a circuit split by parting ways from their colleagues in
five other circuits, lacks the necessary discussion to warrant such a drastic

315. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 1,
22 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459 (emphasis added).
316. Id.
317. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), reply brief for the
petitioners filed, 1, 4 (U.S. Dec. 18, 2018) No. 18-459.
318. Id.
319. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), reply brief for the
petitioners filed, 1, 5 (U.S. Dec. 18, 2018) No. 18-459.
320. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 888 F.3d 399, 412
(9th Cir. 2018), cert. pending, (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459.
321. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), reply brief for the
petitioners filed, 1, 5 (U.S. Dec. 18, 2018) No. 18-459.
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departure, leaving one to consider if the Court even contemplated the
consequences of its actions, much less in a sufficient manner.322
The Respondents’ attempt to dismiss the forum shopping problem is
also unpersuasive, as the key economic concern in Varjabedian is not why
this case was filed in the Ninth Circuit, but whether plaintiffs will flock to
the Ninth Circuit if the decision is allowed to stand.323 Of course they
will.324
The Respondents attempt to dismiss Emulex’s petition for certiorari
stating, inter alia, that aside from a few errant statements and some
superficial disagreement, there is no legitimate split.325 Thus, the
Respondents incorrectly conclude no further review is warranted.326
Cutting against their own statements, however, the Respondents also state
that a genuine circuit conflict does not exist in a futile attempt to explain
away, what the Ninth Circuit itself acknowledges, as a circuit split as it
parted ways with five other Circuits.327 Emulex is the one, in fact, that
properly gauges the far-reaching impacts that Varjabedian has and will
have, if not reversed, as it states:
Eliminating a scienter requirement also will open the doors to a
whole new class of defendants . . . [T]he scienter element has
traditionally prevented application of Section 14(e) to financial
advisors or commentators on transactions, who, unlike, say,
members of a board of directors, have no direct interest in the
transaction and thus no motive for fraud. But the Ninth Circuit’s
new negligence standard will expose that additional group of
defendants to suit for providing negligent advice to their clients or
even to the public at large.328
Moreover, the Respondents claim that concerns over creating a de facto
nationwide negligence standard are unwarranted because it is geography,
not lenient standards, that drives the Ninth Circuit’s docket.329

322. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), reply brief for the
petitioners filed, 1, 7 (U.S. Dec. 18, 2018) No. 18-459.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), brief for the respondents
in opposition filed, 1, 7 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2018) No. 18-459.
326. Id.
327. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 888 F.3d 399, 409
(9th Cir. 2018), cert. pending, (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459.
328. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), reply brief for the
petitioners filed, 1, 7 (U.S. Dec. 18, 2018) No. 18-459.
329. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), brief for the respondents
in opposition filed, 1, 26 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2018) No. 18-459.
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The Respondents attempt to use statistical analysis to justify the above
proposition claiming that approximately the same percentage of all cases
are filed in the Ninth Circuit relative to the population it serves.330 This
statistical analysis, however, fails to account for Section 14(e)’s liberal
jurisdiction requirements that allows for a class action plaintiff to bring a
suit in the Ninth Circuit if he or she satisfies the 1934 Act’s liberal
jurisdiction provision providing that:
Section 27 of the Exchange Act provides that venue is proper
anywhere, among other places, that the defendant is found or is an
inhabitant or transacts business.331
As a result of this liberal jurisdictional requirement, a plaintiff may file
Section 14(e) tender offer claims against a corporation in any district where
the corporation ‘transacts business’; however, most public companies
transact business and conduct tender offers across all 50 states.332
Therefore, stockholder plaintiffs, then, are likely to take advantage of the
lower negligence standard for Section 14(e) claims in the Ninth Circuit.333
Rational economic actors are likely to respond to new constraints on
their behavior.334 The belief that Respondents subscribe to is that class
action plaintiffs’ attorneys will not forum shop merger objection suits, as
the Respondent states that venue decisions are motivated by a multitude of
considerations.335
The Respondents’ argument is incomplete and, accordingly,
unconvincing as members of the plaintiffs’ bar, despite their protestations
to the contrary, are rational economic actors.336 Further, the Respondents
conveniently fail to address the statistical reality that, the Ninth Circuit
already attracts a disproportionate number of merger objection filings.337
Finally, although half of all U.S. corporations and over sixty-seven percent
of all Fortune 500 companies are incorporated in Delaware, in 2017, only

330. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), brief for the respondents
in opposition filed, 1, 26 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2018) No. 18-459.
331. Brief for the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, supra note 1, at 14.
332. Id. at 4.
333. Id.
334. HENRY BUTLER, CHRISTOPHER DRAHOZAL, AND JOANNA SHEPHERD, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
FOR LAWYERS 1, 10 (3rd ed. 2014).
335. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), brief for the respondents
in opposition filed, 1, 26 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2018) No. 18-459; JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 1, 140 (1st ed. 2008).
336. JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 1,
140 (1st ed. 2008).
337. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), reply brief for the
petitioners filed, 1, 14 (U.S. Dec. 18, 2018) No. 18-459.
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twenty-five percent of all federal-court challenges to deals were filed in the
Third Circuit.338
Accordingly, the Respondents fail to provide convincing answers to the
three key premises (summarized at the beginning of Section V of this
Article) that aim to validate the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning. On balance, the
risk of creating a sudden, de facto nationwide negligence standard for
Section 14(e) via forum shopping is substantial if the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Varjabedian stands.339

VI. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Varjabedian departs from half a century
of established case law and creates a circuit split with five other circuits.
The elimination of a scienter requirement for Section 14(e) pleadings
exposes an entirely new class of potential defendants, namely financial
advisors and commentators on transactions. As witnessed following the
Delaware Court of Chancery’s crackdown on disclosure-only fee awards,
the plaintiffs’ bar, as a rational economic actor, does forum shop. The
Ninth Circuit is not immune to this established economic principle, as the
1934 Act’s liberal jurisdiction and venue provisions will only further
promote a de facto nationwide negligence standard for all Section 14(e)
cases.
In addition to both the immense financial stakes and the creation of a
de facto nationwide negligence standard, the Ninth Circuit’s legal analysis
in Varjabedian is misguided. In reviewing Section 14(e)’s legislative
history, the Varjabedian decision cuts against Rule 10b-5, which is the very
antifraud rule after which Section 14(e) was modeled. Moreover, the Ninth
Circuit’s textual analysis fails to examine Section 14(e) in light of its
appropriate context, as words in the same sentence cannot merely be read
in isolation. The Varjabedian decision, at its core, fails to appreciate
private rights of actions versus SEC enforcement actions within Section
14(e)’s appropriate context.
The Ninth Circuit’s Varjabedian decision, for the abovementioned
reasons, is ripe for the Supreme Court to review. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court should reverse the Ninth Circuit’s Varjabedian decision,
holding that Section 14(e) requires a pleading of scienter, not mere
negligence.

338. Id.
339. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 1,
24 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459.
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VII. APPENDIX
For the scope of this Article, the most relevant statutory provisions are
provided below for convenient reference.340
SECTION 17(A) OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
15 U.S.C. § 77Q(A)
§ 77q. Fraudulent interstate transactions
(a) Use of interstate commerce for purpose of
fraud or deceit
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities
(including security-based swaps) or any security-based swap agreement (as
defined in section 78c(a)(78) of this title) by the use of any means or
instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or
by use of the mails, directly or indirectly—
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading; or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
***
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934

340. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 409–10 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, i,
iv (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018) No. 18-459.
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15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
§ 78j. Manipulative and deceptive devices
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange—
***
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, or any securities-based swap agreement any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
***
Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e)
§ 78n. Proxies
***
(e) Untrue statement of material fact or omission of fact with respect to
tender offer
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are
made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer or
request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in
opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation. The
Commission shall, for the purposes of this subsection, by rules and
regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent,
such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.
***
Rule 10b-5
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5
§ 240.10b–5 Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
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(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.

